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ABSTRACT
The Mekong River (MR) is shared by six countries: China, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, and Vietnam. Over the years there have been both conict and cooperation on
managing the water resources to meet population growth, climate change and the desire for
economic development. Currently, the MR Committee (MRC) has weak policy instruments.
This paper exploits an axiomatic bargaining approach to examine how China and the MRC
might negotiate e¤ective joint management. We investigate what welfare improvements
arise from strengthening the MRC and propose an alternative o¤ering for the MRs joint
management that is preferable to the status quo from the perspective of all nations. We
show that there are little gains from cooperation unless international institutions provide a
budget to promote cooperation with China. Alternatively, strengthening the MR Committee
has the potential to achieve large welfare improvements.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Mekong River (MR) is the major water source in Southeast Asia, owing through or
forming the border of six countries: China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet-
nam. The MR is not only the source of food, water, and transport for over 70 million people
from over 90 distinct ethnic groups, the river basin is also home to over 1,300 species of
sh, creating one of the most diverse sheries in the world (Campbell, 2009; Osborne, 2010).
Over the years there has been conict and cooperation on water resource management to ac-
commodate for population growth, climate change and the desire for economic development.
Although the four downstream nations in the Lower Mekong (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia,
and Vietnam) signed the 1995 Agreement2 and formed the Mekong River Committee (MRC)
to promote development and management of the river and its resources in a sustainable man-
ner (MRC, 2005), the sustainable developmentprovision remains largely ambiguous due
to the lack of a legal framework and procedural elements for management (Phillips et al,
2006; Bearden, 2009; Osborne, 2010). Water allocation is one of the increasingly important
interdependency concerns in the Mekong River Basin (MRB), and is a source of tensions
between the countries that share it (Campbell, 2009).
The literature on water resources management, based on game theory approaches (Dinar
et al, 1992; Dinar and Dinar, 2003; Madani, 2010 and references therein), shows that shar-
ing the total economic benets from cooperation among the river basin countries, if it is
attainable, gives rise to Pareto improvement where every country is better o¤ and none is
worse o¤. This implies that one may hope to bring agreementand thereby cooperation on
how mitigate conicts over water. In most transboundary water resource sharing problems,
allocation outcomes are not primarily determined by economic considerations but also by
the distribution of political and bargaining power. Water, in this sense, accrues more often
simply to the most powerful riparian state within a basin. For the Mekong river, devel-
opments that are taking place in upstream and the tributaries are expected to a¤ect the
downstream communities at di¤erent levels. Moreover, China has unquestionably the most
power. Much of the debate among the member countries can be related to operating current
dams and plans for drastic expansion of dam capacity. Therefore, there is a need for stable
arrangements of a sustainable nature that will satisfy all countries involved.
This paper exploits an axiomatic bargaining approach (i.e. Nash, 1950; Roemer, 1988;
Thoyer et al., 2001) to examine how the MRC might achieve e¤ective development. Taking
the 1995 Agreement as a benchmark, we view the MRB as a transboundary water resource
shared by two regions: upstream (China) and downstream (the MRC formed by Thailand,
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam).3 We consider the following major economic issues in the
MRB: building infrastructure for industrial and householdswater use; dam capacity for
hydropower generation and mitigating ood damage; irrigated agriculture; and saltwater
2The "Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin" was
signed in 1995, and it is known as the 1995 Agreement.
3Due to the topographical fact that the Mekong is of only limited importance to Myanmar (roughly
2%, of the Mekong River drains from the portion of the basin that resides in Myanmar), we distinguish two
regions, namely China and the MRC. Each region acts in its own specic ways to solve the issues of planning,
developing, allocating, distributing and protecting their water resources.
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intrusion in the estuary during the dry season. The highly centralized Chinese government
has more grip on its water economy than the fragmented and less e¤ective management by
the MRC. One research issue is what the benets of improved river management by the MRC
and its associated governments are. Since basin-wide joint management did not develop in
the MRB, the question is whether an international aid should be aimed at strengthening
the MRCs management or providing extra nancial incentives to widen the agenda for joint
management. The aim of this paper is to deal with these issues in a bargaining framework
and to propose an alternative o¤ering in MRBs joint management that is preferable to the
current situation for all nations.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the basic model that extends
the framework of Haddad (2010) in which dam capacity is endogenous. Some theoretical
insights of the model, concerning the disagreement point, the applied bargaining solution and
decentralized water prices, are presented in section 3. These results are embedded within the
terminology of Houba (2008). Section 4 discusses numerical calculations of our model for the
MRB and analyses the opportunities that can enhance e¤ective regional cooperation under
di¤erent scenarios including nancial accounts and decentralize water prices. Concluding
remarks and directions for further research follow in the last section.
II.MODEL FRAMEWORK
Our model respects the physical hydrological basin-reality with a unidirectional water ow
from upstream to downstream. Total basin-wide water available is determined by total-wide
precipitation or water (in)ows. We distinguish two seasons, the wet season (w) and the dry
season (d), and two regions or countries, denoted by i = 1; 2 and region 1 lies upstream of
region 2. Each region has the option to build dam capacity, denoted by Di. It is used as
infrastructure to provide end users such as industry and households with water, it is also
used for hydropower generation and to store water from the wet season, denoted by yi, for
usage in the dry season. Due to evaporation losses, only iyi, i 2 (0; 1),4 can be used in
the dry season. Water availability, including inows and river ows, determine water usage
in each region i = 1; 2 and each season  = w; d. Water users within the same region
are aggregated into three categories of representative consumers: Industry and households,
hydropower generators and agriculture irrigators. Transboundary ows from upstream to
downstream are sensitive to changes by upstreams water use and storage management.
The Water Balances
Following Haddad (2010), our model represents building dam capacity and hydropower gen-
eration in each region. We then extend it by adding water uses, ood damage and saltwater
intrusion. The river basin in space and time is presented in Figure 1.
In the wet season w at region 1, inow f1;w can be spent on water use by industry and
households x1;w, storage y1 for the dry season, hydropower generation q1;w that is reusable
further downstream, and pass-through by the dam to downstream. River outow from the
4Haddad (2010) assumes a single location and that there are no evaporation losses, i.e. i = 1, i = 1; 2.
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Figure 1: Seasons, locations and water uses in the river basin.
dam o1;w consists of q1;w and pass-through that runs directly to downstream and might
cause ood damage. In season d; at region 1, inow f1;d and the fraction of stored water 1y1
can be spent on water use x1;d, hydropower generation q1;d that remains available further
downstream, and pass-through by the dam to downstream. River outow from the dam
o1;d can be used either for irrigation i1;d in the upstream region (assuming an irrigation
infrastructure that is independent of capacity D1) or runs to downstream. This imposes
i1;d  o1;d. Formally, upstreams water balances5 are given by
x1;w + y1 + q1;w  f1;w; (1)
x1;w + y1 + o1;w = f1;w; (2)
x1;d + q1;d  f1;d + 1y1; (3)
x1;d + o1;d = f1;d + 1y1; (4)
i1;d  o1;d: (5)
In Figure 1, both o1;w and o1;d are expressed as the residuals from inow minus water use.
5This formulation extends the model for optimal hydropower generation in Haddad (2010) to include the
necessary infrastructure for industrial and householdswater use.
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Dam capacity D1 at region 1 imposes the restrictions
x1;w + y1 + q1;w  D1; (6)
x1;d + q1;d  D1: (7)
In the wet season w at region 2, inow f2;w and o1;w can be spent on water use by industry and
households x2;w, storage y2 for the dry season, hydropower generation q2;w that is reusable
further downstream, and pass-through by the dam to downstream. River outow from the
dam o2;w might cause ood damage before owing into the estuary. In the dry season d at
region 2, inow f2;d, stored water 2y2 and net inow o1;d i1;d received from upstream can be
spent on water use x2;d, hydropower generation q2;d that remains available, and pass-through
by the dam. River outow from the dam o2;d can be used either for irrigation i2;d in the
own region or left to combat saltwater intrusion in the estuary before owing into the sea.
Formally, the water balances are given by
x2;w + y2 + q2;w  f2;w + o1;w; (8)
x2;w + y2 + o2;w = f2;w + o1;w; (9)
x2;d + q2;d  f2;d + 2y2 + o1;d   i1;d; (10)
x2;d + q2;d + o2;d = f2;d + 2y2 + o1;d   i1;d; (11)
i2;d  o2;d: (12)
Dam capacity D2 at region 2 imposes the restrictions
x2;w + y2 + q2;w  D2; (13)
x2;d + q2;d  D2: (14)
This completes the description of the water balances.
Cost and Benets
There are three water users that create economic value. Consumptive uses by industry
and households in both regions permanently remove amounts of water in the wet and dry
seasons. The economic value of consumptive use xi; in region i in season  is given by the
logarithmic value function vi; ln (xi; )   ci;xi; , which is a concave function with satiation
point xi; = vi;=ci; > 0. Both, x1;w and x1;d are externalities for downstream, as is storage
y1. The net benets from hydropower qi; in region i in season  are given by the logarithmic
benet function hi; ln (qi; ). The net benets from irrigation ii;d in region i in season d are
ai;d ln (ii;d)  i;dii;d, which is also a concave function with satiation point {i;d = ai;d=i;d > 0.
Following Haddad (2010), the costs of building dam capacityDi of water in region i are ci Di.
These costs include the annuities of the capital costs and the operating and management
costs. The operating costs of storing yi of water are ciyi. Storing water is costly in three
ways: building capital, operating costs and evaporation losses.
River ows also involve costs associated with ooding in the wet season and saltwater in-
trusion in the estuary. The costs of ood damage are ci;f  (oi;w   oi;w), where oi;w  0.
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In the dry season, outow o2;d   i2;d to the estuary combats saltwater intrusion with costs
c2;d (o2;d   i2;d), a convex function c2;d () with c02;d () < 0. The costs decrease when more
fresh water ows into the estuary. We regard irrigation i2;d as irrigation at elevated inland
plots that are immune to saltwater intrusion, and irrigation on plots at the lowest parts of
the delta can be included as benets in the costs function for saltwater intrusion. In our
simulation, we left out costs for saltwater intrusion because we lacked data on costs and
there is a constant river ow from Tonle Sap in Cambodia to the estuary that minimizes salt
water intrusion.6
As will be clear from Figure 1, upstreams decisions impose externalities on downstreams
water availability. These externalities are positive in case upstream stores more water in the
wet season, i.e. less ood damage downstream, and negative in case upstreams decisions
reduces downstreams water inow in the dry season, i.e. increased water scarcity and more
saltwater intrusion. This extends the negative externalities of water scarcity in Ambec and
Ehlers (2008) to a combination of positive and negative externalities. To overcome these
externalities, we assume that international aid provides a budget b  0 such that each
location i obtains a (possibly negative) transfer ti and
t1 + t2  b; (15)
where the  expresses that the regions are free to dispose some fraction of b. We regard
transfers as representing either money or some tradable produce.
Upstreams utility function u1 (x1;w; x1;d; q1;w; q1;d; i1;d; D1; t1; o1;w) is given by
v1;w ln (x1;w)  c1;wx1;w + v1;d ln (x1;d)  c1;dx1;d + h1;w ln (q1;w) + h1;d ln (q1;d) +
a1;d ln (i1;d)  1;di1;d + t1   c1D1   c1;f (o1;w   o1;w) (16)
and downstreams utility function u2 (x2;w; x2;d; q2;w; q2;d; i2;d; D2; t2; o2;w; o2;d) is given by
v2;w ln (x2;w)  c2;wx2;w+v2;d ln (x2;d)  c2;dx2;d+h2;w ln (q2;w)+h2;d ln (q2;d)+
a2;d ln (i2;d)  2;di2;d+t2 c2D2 c2;f (o2;w   o2;w) c2;d (o2;d   i2;d) : (17)
This completes the description of costs and benets of water use.
III. MODEL SPECIFICATION
In this paper, we explore an axiomatic bargaining approach in the form of the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution (for details, see e.g. Nash, 1950). This solution maximizes an
objective function that depends upon the regions utilities, the so-called disagreement point,
and bargaining weights reecting the relative power between the regions. The Nash bargain-
ing solution allows an underpinning by the strategic alternating-o¤ers model in Rubinstein
(1982) (for details, see e.g. Binmore et al. 1986, and Houba, 2007, 2008).
6Personal communication with professor Daene McKinney.
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The Disagreement Point
The disagreement point plays an important role in the Nash bargaining solution. In the
MRB, upstream China is a highly centralized economy with a strong government, whereas
downstreams MRC can be regarded as a rather politically divided government with weak
instruments. For that reason, we will assume that upstream maximizes its own regional
welfare and internalizes its own regional externalities but not the downstream regions ex-
ternalities. For downstream, we assume river management is ine¤ective in the sense that
end users and dam operators in this region optimize their own benets without taking into
account any externalities at all.7 Hence, we treat the model as a game in normal form and
take its unique Nash equilibrium (NE) as the disagreement point. Due to the directional
manner of externalities in which upstream inuences downstream but not vice versa, we may
solve the Nash equilibrium sequentially similar as in e.g. Ambec and Ehlers (2008). First,
the upstream region maximizes its regional welfare, then downstreams dam operator solves
his decision problem before downstreams agricultural sector solves its irrigation problem.
The last two agents do not take into account any externalities they cause, which represents
river management with weak governance. After having derived the disagreement point, we
investigate the Nash bargaining solution.
Region 1 has a river basin management with strong policy instruments that internalizes
its own regional externalities. This regions objective function is given by the function
u1 (x1;w; x1;d; q1;w; q1;d; i1;d; D1; t1; o1;w; o1;d). After substituting out the ow variables o1;w and
o1;d from (2) and (4), we obtain the following program for upstream:
d1 = max
x1;w;x1;d;q1;w;q1;d;i1;d;D1;y1
v1;w ln (x1;w)  c1;wx1;w + v1;d ln (x1;d)  c1;dx1;d + (18)
h1;w ln (q1;w) + h1;d ln (q1;d) + a1;d ln (i1;d)  1;di1;d
 c1D1   c1;f (f1;w   x1;w   y1) ;
s.t.
x1;w + y1 + q1;w  f1;w; (p1;w)
x1;d + q1;d  f1;d + 1y1; (p1;d)
i1;d  f1;d + 1y1   x1;d; (1;d)
x1;w + y1 + q1;w  D1;
 
1;w

x1;d + q1;d  D1;
 
1;d

where all symbols between brackets denote shadow prices. The maximal welfare is region
1s disagreement point in the negotiations for a joint river basin management.
The politically divided downstream region with weak instruments is modelled by two agents
that sequentially take decisions. The rst agent decides the dam capacity for the joint use of
industrial and householdswater use and hydropower generation. The second agent decides
on irrigation. These agents do not take into account external e¤ects, or to put it di¤erently,
7From a technical point of view, we demonstrate two di¤erent ways of modelling regions. In essences,
any combination of weak and strong can be modelled, such as both weak, both strong or the opposite case
with upstream being weak and downstream strong.
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no policy to price externalities is present in the downstream region. Given Nash equilibrium
quantities oNE1;w , o
NE
1;d and i
NE
1;d for upstream, the downstream dam-building agent solves
max
x2;w;x2;d;q2;w;q2;d;D2;y2
v2;w ln (x2;w)  c2;wx2;w + v2;d ln (x2;d)  c2;dx2;d + (19)
h2;w ln (q2;w) + h2;d ln (q2;d)  c2D2;
s.t.
x2;w + y2 + q2;w  f2;w + 2y2 + oNE1;w ; (p2;w)
x2;d + q2;d  f2;d + 2y2 + oNE1;d   iNE1;d ; (p2;d)
x2;w + y2 + q2;w  D2;
 
2;w

x2;d + q2;d  D2;
 
2;d

where all symbols between brackets denote shadow prices. Also oNE1;w > 0 seems realistic
for the MRB, and therefore, D2 < f2;w + oNE1;w seems appropriate. The dam operators
optimal management induces equilibrium river ows oNE2;w and o
NE
2;d from the dam. Then, the
downstream irrigation sector, who is most downstream of all water users, solves
max
i2;d
a2;d ln (i2;d)  2;di2;d; s.t. i2;d  oNE2;d (2;d) : (20)
This program can be solved straightforwardly as optimal irrigation is i1;d = min

{1;d; o
NE
1;d
	
.
Downstreams disagreement utility is given by the sum of the utilities of its two agents
utilities and deducting the costs of ooding and saltwater intrusion. Formally,
d2 = v2;w ln
 
xNE2;w
  c2;wxNE2;w + v2;d ln  xNE2;d   c2;dxNE2;d + h2;w ln  qNE2;w +h2;d ln  qNE2;d +
a2;d ln
 
iNE2;d
 2;diNE2;d   c2DNE2  c2;foNE2;w c2;d  oNE2;d   iNE2;d  : (21)
This is the disagreement point under ine¤ective regional water management.
The case of e¤ective river management by downstream would be similar to upstreams op-
timal river management dened (18), but after changing all subscripts 1 into 2 and include
the costs of saltwater intrusion. Comparing the di¤erence between both solutions provides
an estimate for the welfare loss of downstreams ine¤ective river basin management, which
is one issue of interest in our study.
The Nash Bargaining Solution
The regionsdisagreement levels play an important role in the Nash bargaining solution,
which we are about to introduce. For this solution, we characterize the transfers and relate
these to the budget and the solutions other variables.
Formally, we denote  2 [1
2
; 1) as upstreams bargaining weight and 1   2 (0; 1
2
] as down-
streams weight. The bargaining weights reect that upstream has more bargaining or po-
litical power than downstream.
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The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is given by the unique maximizer of the following
program:
max
(u1;u2)(d1;d2);u1;u2;t1;t2;
x1;w;x1;d;x2;w;x2;d;q1;w;q1;d;q2;w;q2;d;q1;d;i1;d;i2;d;
D1;D2;y1;y2;o1;w;o1;d;o2;w;o2;d
(u1   d1) (u2   d2)1  ; (22)
s.t.
u1  (16) ; (1)
u2  (17) ; (2)
t1 + t2  b; (pm)
and (1)-(15).
A novel aspect that we implement in the latter program is the role of international aid or
external budget b  0. For that reason, we derive how the external budget b accrues to
upstream and downstream through the the negotiated transfers.
Proposition 1 The Nash bargaining solution implies transfers given by
t1 = b+  (w2 ()  d2)  (1  ) (w1 ()  d1) ; (23)
t2 = (1  ) b+ (1  ) (w1 ()  d1)   (w2 ()  d2) ; (24)
where wi () = u1 ()  ti denotes region is utility in the Nash bargaining solution.
This result shows that the negotiated transfers depend upon the exogenous budget b 
0 provided by the international organizations. The stronger region, here by assumption
upstream, obtains the lion share of the external budget. This is, however, only the direct
e¤ect of the external budget, and there are also indirect e¤ects. To see this, note that b and
(1  ) b push the playersutilities u1 and u2 upward in the Nash product and this changes
the marginal contributions of the utilities to the Nash product. Therefore, the optimal
allocation also adjusts due to substitution e¤ects. What the magnitudes of the direct and
indirect e¤ects are, will be investigated in our numerical application to the MRB.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS FOR JOINT MRB MANAGEMENT
In this section, we perform our numerical analysis. First, we discuss the benchmark using
the 1995 data. After that, we present the results for the case without cooperation where
we distinguish between upstream and downstream, respectively. These results form the
disagreement levels used in the Nash bargaining solution.
Benchmark
The yearly water inows and the water withdrawals for households and industry use, i.e.,
the so-called consumptive use, are given in Table 1. The Mekong River is known for its huge
seasonal variability with the ratio of 9:1 for water availability in the wet and dry seasons.
From this ratio, we can easily obtain the water inows in both seasons.
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Water availability Consumptive use
Upstream 2812 500
Downstream 1492 104
Table 1: Water availability and consumptive use (in km3).
Source: Adapted from Ringler (2001).
Table 2 shows the economic value created from di¤erent types of water use in the two
regions. Yunnan province of China is one of the poorer areas in China, which is reected by
the low total economic value in this region. The economic value generated downstream is
the aggregate over the MRC members. The ratio of value of one type of water and the total
prot of all water use reects the relative importance or the weight of that particular type
of water use in the economy.
Upstream Downstream
Irrigation 20 893
Consumptive use 11 159
Hydropower incl. sheries 0.05 589
Wetlands 0 134
Total 31 1778
Table 2: Prots from di¤erent types of water uses in million US$.
Source: adapted from Ringler et al. (2004).
To calibrate the model, we use the ratio of the prot for each category of water use and the
total prot in Table 2 to generate the coe¢ cients of the value functions for both upstream
and downstream region. Besides, we also use the water withdrawal in 1995 as the benchmark
for the total consumptive use of households and industry in wet and dry season. Further, we
assume some values for the reserving costs, ooding costs, dam-building costs and irrigation
costs to make the model completely-specied. As mentioned before, we set the costs of salt
water intrusion equal to zero. This allows us to solve this model numerically and obtain
results on water allocation to each type of water use, the possible expanding dam capacity
and the shadow prices for each type of water. This roughly reects or replicates the current
situations in both regions.
Upstream
In the absence of cooperation, each region maximizes its own economic value. For upstream,
we implemented optimization program (18) and solved it numerically. Table 3 presents
upstreams water balances under the non-cooperative scenario. In such an economy with
the given technologies (parameters) and value functions, the river ow to downstream in the
wet and dry season are 1552 and 0 km3, respectively. In the wet season, upstream region
(China) uses 329 km3 water for consumptive use (domestic and industry), reserves 649 km3
of water for irrigation in the dry season as its rst priority, and distributes a small amount
of hydropower (2 km3 water) according to the marginal values of these usages. The water
outows to the downstream in the wet season is 1552 km3, and in dry season is 0 km3. The
economic value of water use for the upstream region in this noncooperative scenario is 316
million US$.
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Water balances upstream Wet Dry
Precipitation 2530.800 281.200
Reserved water 649.159 -649.159
Consumptive use 329.337 170.674
Hydropower generation 1.534 759.686
Outow from dams 1552.304 759.686
Irrigation 759.686
Outow to downstream 1552.304
Table 3: Upstreams water balances (in km3).
Table 4 presents the results on upstreams shadow prices under no cooperation. Under the
current water inows and existing technologies, the irrigation sector has a very high shadow
price, which means this is a demanding part of water use in the dry season for China. Given
the reserving costs, China cannot reserve more than 649 km3 of water in wet season. The
shadow price of the consumptive use in wet season is zero implying that there is su¢ cient
water for this purpose. The shadow price of water for consumptive use in the dry season
is non-zero (0:2 million US$) anymore, implying that there is water scarcity. The shadow
price of water for hydropower generation in wet season is very large, because the existing
capacity of dams is very small in upstream region. Therefore, it is more e¢ cient to reserve
water for irrigation in dry season than using water for hydropower generation in wet season.
Furthermore, the high shadow price of hydropower water in the wet season also explains the
need for expanding dam capacity under the given building costs, because it can achieve the
highest prot. The shadow price of hydropower water in dry season is zero because water is
reserved for irrigation and pass through the dam before it reaches agricultural users.
Wet Dry
Consumptive water 0.0 0.2
Hydropower water 105.0 0.0
Irrigation water 0.0 55.0
Table 4: Upstreams shadow prices per water usage under no cooperation in million US$.
Downstream
Downstream users take the outow from upstream (1552 and 0 km3 in wet and dry season
respectively) as an externality. We implemented river basin management under weak and
strong governance. For weak governance, we implement optimization program (19) and
(20), then we sequentially solve these in the stated order, and as a nal step we compute
(21). Strong governance required to implement optimization program (18) after making the
appropriate adjustments mentioned just after (21). Table 5 presents downstreams water
balances under weak and strong governance. Since more externalities (at the regional level
only) are internalized under strong governance than under weak governance, and therefore
under strong governance, there will be 333:4 km3 less water outow from the dam in the
wet season to mitigate ood damages, because strong governance internalizes externalities.
This is accomplished by storing 294:7 km3 of water and encouraging more consumptive use
38:7 km3. For the same reason, hydropower generation is reduced by 124:8 km3 in the wet
season under strong governance. The stored water is used to increase hydropower generation
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in the dry season and to increase irrigation. So, the economic costs of dam building, storing
water and less hydropower generation in the wet season are compensated by reduced ood
damages and increased consumptive use in the wet season, increased hydropower generation
and irrigation in the dry season.
Water balances downstream Weak governance Strong governance
Wet Dry Wet Dry
Precipitation 1342:8 149:2 1342:8 149:2
River ow from upstream 1552:3 1552:3
Water availability 2895:1 149:2 2895:1 149:2
Reserved water 1:0  1:0 295:7  295:7
Consumptive use 37:2 21:1 75:9 28:1
Hydropower generation 456:1 129:1 331:3 416:8
Outow from dams 2856:9 129:1 2523:5 416:8
Irrigation 129:1 416:8
Outow to the estuary 2856:9 2523:5
Table 5: Downstreams water balances (in km3):
Table 6 presents the results on the shadow prices. The shadow price in the wet season
for domestic and industry use in downstream region is also zero, implying that they have
su¢ cient water for this purpose. They reserve 296 km3 water for dry season because they can
use if for irrigation. The shadow price of hydropower in the dry season is zero because water
is reserved for irrigation although it pass through the dam rst for hydropower generation.
As such, the economic value of downstream is 422:8 and 467 million US$ under weak and
strong governance, respectively. So, the economic costs of weak government are 44:2 million
US$.
Wet Dry
Consumptive water 0.0 79.5
Hydropower water 100.0 ~.0
Irrigation water 0.0 70.5
Table 6: Downstreams shadow prices per water usage under no cooperation (in million
US$)
Existing and the expansion of dam capacity is presented in Table 7. Downstream region has
a higher dam capacity (494 km3) in the current situation, compared to a capacity of 4 km3
in upstream region. Upstream prefers to expand its dam capacity considerably. Under weak
governance, there is no expansion of dam capacity in the Lower Mekong, but under strong
governance there would be but it is relatively smaller compared to upstreams expansion (209
versus 975 km3). Besides, this also leads to the lower relative shadow price of hydropower
water in wet season with respect to the irrigation water in downstream than in upstream,
because downstream users have a higher coe¢ cient for hydropower generation in their value
function.
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Dam Capacity Upstream Downstream
Weak governance Strong governance
Existing 4:5 494:3 494:3
Expansion 975:5 0 208:6
Total 980:0 494:3 702:9
Table 7: Dam capacity under no cooperation (in km3).
Note that we calibrated the model with data from 1995, a time when China did not have
much dams installed in the MR, and that China started to expand dam capacity rapidly
after. By now, it is claimed that China has already completed three dams with an aggregate
dam capacity of 40.0 km3 and plans another thirteen dams in the near future (Osborne,
2010). Our model predictions therefore reect the long-term development already going on
in China and that China is able to carry out without the cooperation with downstream.
Whether all legal rights of downstream are respected is a di¤erent matter that we omit.
Downstream has already installed many dams and its expansion is more modest. Under
weak governance expansion has even reached its maximal level.
If there is no cooperation or water basin agreement, the two regions only care about their own
economic values and allocate water use according to their value functions. The upstream
users will not consider the externality they generate upon the downstream users and the
downstream users just take this externality as given in their economic activities. This is not
economically e¢ cient because water is in principle not used to the possibly highest value. We
are now turning to show how cooperation through bargaining can achieve the more e¢ cient
use of water in the river basin, i.e. obtaining higher economic values in two regions. The
economic value of upstream is 316 million US$, while the downstream are 422:8 million US$
and 467 million US$ under weak and strong governance.
Cooperation
In the bargaining model, the two regions have the possibility of bargaining aiming to achieve
the highest cooperative prot. We implemented optimization program (22) and ran four
scenarios, depending upon upstreams bargaining power of  being :5 and :75, and the
exogenous budget b being 0 or 100 million US$. The simulated solutions for  = :5 and
 = :75 almost coincide with those for the situation describing non-cooperation whenever
b = 0, and we forego presenting the water balances for these cases. Also for b = 100, the
bargaining solution for both s coincides, and we report the one for  = :75 since upstream
China has more political power than downstream.
 b Upstream Downstream
No cooperation 316:000 467:000
Cooperation :5 0 316:014 467:086
:5 100 367:509 518:509
:75 0 316:045 467:022
:75 100 393:263 492:754
Table 8: Economic values for no cooperation and four scenarios of cooperation (in million
US$).
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We only consider the strong governance case of the downstream for the cooperation regime.
Table 8 reports the regionseconomic values for each of these four scenarios and the situation
with no cooperation. Without an exogenous budget to promote cooperation, our simulations
reveal a lack of incentives to reach agreement: The gains from cooperation are simply too
small. This might explain why upstream China and the Lower Mekong fail to even negotiate
joint river basin management. If so, an exogenous budget has to provide such incentives.
Indeed, an budget of b = 100 million US$ provides the incentives for cooperation. The party
with the most bargaining power will attract most of the gains from cooperation, which is
upstream China in case of the MRB. Also, Proposition 1 indicates that China receives a
share  of the budget b plus something else. We investigate these numbers in Table 9.
E¤ect Upstream Downstream Total
 = :5 b = 100 Transfer 65:594 34:406
Indirect e¤ect  14:099 17:017
Net value e¤ect 51:495 51:423 102:92
 = :75 b = 100 Transfer 91:349 8:651
Indirect e¤ect  14:131 17:081
Net value e¤ect 77:218 25:732 102: 95
Table 9: Economic value gains attributed to transfers and indirect e¤ects (in million US$)
The indirect e¤ect is equal to the total increase in economic value (from no cooperation
to b is 100 million US$) minus the transfer received. We observe that upstream receives
the lion share of the exogenous budget provided by the international organizations, but in
order to get the transfer upstream has to implement costly policies that benet downstream.
The sum of indirect e¤ects is a modest 2:9 million US$ when compared to the budget of
100 million US$. For equal bargaining power, the increase in economic value is split almost
equally, but about one third of downstreams gains from cooperation come from changes in
water management. For unequal bargaining power, upstream gets about a share of  of the
joint value increase. The indirect e¤ects are relatively modest for upstream, but are about
two thirds of downstream increase in economic value.
Dam Capacity Upstream Downstream
No coop. Cooperation No coop. Cooperation
Existing 4:5 4:5 494:3 494:3
Expansion 975:5 1234:3 208:6 137:9
Total 980:0 1238:8 702:9 632:2
Table 10: Dam capacity of the MRB (in km3). Cooperation:  = :75 and b = 100:
Table 10 reports the expansion of dam capacity under the noncooperative and cooperative
situation for  = :75 and b = 100. Upstream expands and downstream contracts its planned
dam capacity. The main reason is that upstream dams prevent ooding twice and water
stored for upstream hydropower can also be used later either for hydropower generation,
consumptive use or irrigation. Therefore, downstream has less reason to build dam capacity
for ood prevention, only as infrastructure for hydropower generation and consumptive use.
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Water balances upstream No cooperation Cooperation
Wet Dry Wet Dry
Precipitation 2530:800 281:200 2530:800 281:200
Reserved water 649:159  649:159 906:643  906:643
Consumptive use 329:337 170:674 329:337 170:674
Hydropower generation 1:534 759:686 2:812 1017:170
Outow from dams 1552:304 759:686 1294:820 1017:170
Irrigation 759:686 759:686
Outow to downstream 1552:304 1294:820 257:484
Table 11: Water balances upstream (in km3). Cooperation:  = :75 and b = 100:
We discuss upstreams water balances rst. From Table 11, we conclude that consumptive
use and hydropower generation in both seasons and irrigation in the dry season remain
at their satiation levels and that the main di¤erence concerns the storage of water that
increases by 39:7% from 649:159 to 906:643. The reduced outow in the wet season mitigating
ood damages in both regions is 257:48, which is a reduction of the river ow by 16:6%.
Consequently, the river ow increases in the dry season. This increase does not cause ood
damages. And it mitigates water scarcity in the dry season. Of course, water traveling 4200
km along the MR takes time and delays are not captured in our simple framework. Delays
may partly undo the positive e¤ects of water storage by upstream in the wet season, as do
natural bounds that limit the maximal physically-feasible dam capacity. These issues are
left for future research.
Water balances downstream No cooperation Cooperation
Wet Dry Wet Dry
Precipitation 1342:8 149:2 1342:8 149:2
River ow from upstream 1552:3 1294:8 258:0
Water availability 2895:1 149:2 2637:6 407:2
Reserved water 295:7  295:7 225:0  225:0
Consumptive use 75:9 28:1 75:9 28:1
Hydropower generation 331:3 416:8 331:3 604:1
Outow from dams 2523:5 416:8 2336:7 416:8
Irrigation 416:8 416:8
Outow to the estuary 2523:5 2336:7 187:3
Table 12: Water balances downstream (in km3). Cooperation:  = :75 and b = 100:
We continue by discussing downstreams water balances. From Table 12 we conclude that
consumptive use in both seasons, hydropower generation in the wet season, and irrigation
in the dry season remain at their satiation levels. Hydropower generation in the dry season
increases because the increased inow from upstream in this season increases water availabil-
ity in the dry season. Water storage is costly not only in terms of dam capacity, but also in
operating costs. For these reasons, the increased river ow is used to generate hydropower.
The reduced river ow coming from upstream mitigates ood damages and makes the need
for downstream to reduce those damages by storing water less pressing. This is another rea-
son why downstream stores less water under joint river basin management. So, we observe
less river ow in the wet season and an increase in river ow during the dry season.
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V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Transboundary water resources are often a cause for conict among riparian entities and
negotiations over water among sovereign nations are typically di¢ cult. Smaller and weaker
countries are su¤ering most because they have neither the political clout nor the economic
strength to achieve their goals (Kirmani and LeMoigne, 1997). Negotiations on the allocation
of a water resource (or the benets from using it) are more di¢ cult when one does not know
in advance how much water supply or demand will be generated under future conditions
(e.g., population growth, economic activities, climate change ) such as the Mekong River
situation. This paper explore alternative o¤erings for the MRB. Though the MRCs task
is to promote development and management of the river and its resources in a sustainable
manner, it lacks a legal framework and procedural elements to make such management
a success. Furthermore, e¢ cient river basin management requires the cooperation by all
countries in the basin, including China.
Exploring axiomatic bargaining approach in the form of the asymmetric Nash bargaining
solution to the MRB, our numerical analysis indicates that the gains from cooperation are
rather insignicant and that China and the MRC have insu¢ cient incentives for joint river
basin management. These results may explain the current practice in which China and
Myanmar are willing to be the observers of the MRC and not involved in other cooperation
with the MRC. Yet, many perceive current practice as insu¢ cient to meet sustainability of
the river. International institutions, such as the World Bank or Asian Development Bank,
might promote cooperation by enlarging the surplus in case agreement on cooperation would
be reached.
Our numerical analysis also shows that an exogenous budget provides stronger incentives for
cooperation in the MRB because it o¤sets the small gains from cooperation. Without the
exogenous budget an alternative o¤ering may be to forget about such cooperation. Instead,
China and the MRC could develop their part of the basin, where downstream has to adapt
to Chinas future development path in order to be sustainable in the near future. The
MRC, therefore, has to obtain a solid legal framework with strong procedural elements that
can implement river basin management. Our nding shows that the welfare gains from
strengthening the MRC are substantial, and might o¤er an attractive road map that is
independent of "unwilling" China.
Some of the usual caveats apply to our analysis. Despite the presence of the MRC, China
is a country that reluctantly discloses data about its national policies. Also for the MRC,
good data to feed economic models is hard to nd. Our model is calibrated based upon these
data limitations. Also the spatial and temporal scale of our numerical model allows further
improvement. Since the four member countries forming the MRC are lumped together, it
would be preferable to disaggregate these countries in order to further investigate where
unanimity for cooperation can be found. For that reason, we regard our analysis as a rst
step in developing models that take these issues seriously.
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Dene wi () = u1 ()  ti, then the Lagrangian function is given by
(u1   d1) (u2   d2)1 
 1 (u1   w1 (x1;w; x1;d; q1;w; q1;d; i1;d; D1; t1; o1;w)  t1)
 2 (u2   w2 (x2;w; x2;d; q2;w; q2;d; i2;d; D2; t2; o2;w; o2;d)  t2)
 pm (t1 + t2   b)  etc.
The rst-order conditions are given by
u1 :  (u1   d1) (1 ) (u2   d2)1    1 = 0;
u2 : (1  ) (u1   d1) (u2   d2)    2 = 0;
t1 : 1   pm = 0;
t2 : 2   pm = 0;
pm (t1 + t2   b) = 0;
1 (u1   w1 (x1;w; x1;d; q1;w; q1;d; i1;d; D1; t1; o1;w)  t1) = 0;
2 (u2   w2 (x2;w; x2;d; q2;w; q2;d; i2;d; D2; t2; o2;w; o2;d)  t2) = 0:
We obtain
 (u1   d1) (1 ) (u2   d2)1  = (1  ) (u1   d1) (u2   d2)  = 1 = 2 = pm > 0;
because Pareto ine¢ ciency of the Nash equilibrium underlying d1 and d2 implies that the
rst two terms will be positive. These two terms and t1 + t2 = b, we obtain from
 (w2 + b  t1   d2) = (1  ) (w1 + t1   d1)
that (23) and (24).
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